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One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of free will skepticism is 
that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the 
responses it would permit as justifi ed are insuffi cient for acceptable social 
policy.  This concern is fueled by two factors.  The fi rst is that one of 
the most prominent justifi cations for punishing criminals, retributivism, 
is incompatible with free will skepticism.  The second concern is that 
alternative justifi cations that are not ruled out by the skeptical view per se 
face signifi cant independent moral objections (Pereboom, 2014, p. 153). 
Yet despite these concerns, I maintain that free will skepticism leaves intact 
other ways to respond to criminal behavior—in particular incapacitation, 
rehabilitation, and alteration of relevant social conditions—and that these 
methods are both morally justifi able and suffi cient for good social policy. 
The position I defend is similar to Derk Pereboom’s (2001, 2013, 2014), 
taking as its starting point his quarantine analogy, but it sets out to develop 
the quarantine model within a broader justifi catory framework drawn from 
public health ethics.  The resulting model—which I call the public health-
quarantine model—provides a framework for justifying quarantine and 
criminal sanctions that is more humane than retributivism and preferable 
to other non-retributive alternatives.  It also provides a broader approach 
to criminal behavior than Pereboom’s quarantine analogy does on its own.
I. Free Will Skepticism vs. Retributivism
In the past, the standard argument for free will skepticism was hard 
determinism: the view that determinism is true and incompatible with free 
will and moral responsibility—either because it precludes the ability to 
do otherwise (leeway incompatibilism) or because it is inconsistent with 
one’s being the “ultimate source” of action (source incompatibilism).  Hard 
determinism had its classic statement in the time when Newtonian physics 
reigned (e.g., d’Holbach, 1770) but it has very few defenders today.1 
Most contemporary skeptics instead defend positions that are agnostic 
about determinism—e.g., Derk Pereboom (2001), Galen Strawson (1986), 
Saul Smilansky (2000), Neil Levy (2011), Richard Double (1991), Bruce 
Waller (2011), and Gregg Caruso (2012).  Most maintain that while 
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determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility, so too 
is indeterminism, especially the variety posited by quantum mechanics. 
Others argue that regardless of the causal structure of the universe, we 
lack free will and moral responsibility because free will is incompatible 
with the pervasiveness of luck (Levy, 2011).  Others (still) argue that free 
will and ultimate moral responsibility are incoherent concepts, since to be 
free in the sense required for ultimate moral responsibility we would have 
to be causa sui (or “cause of oneself”) and this is impossible (Strawson, 
1994, 2011).
What all these skeptical arguments have in common, and what they 
share with classical hard determinism, is the belief that what we do, and 
the way we are, is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control 
and because of this we are never morally responsible for our actions in 
the basic desert sense—the sense that would make us truly deserving of 
blame or praise.  This is not to say that there are not other conceptions of 
responsibility that can be reconciled with determinism, chance, or luck. 
Nor is it to deny that there may be good pragmatic reasons to maintain 
certain systems of punishment and reward.  Rather, it is to insist that to 
hold people truly or ultimately morally responsible for their actions—i.e., 
to hold them responsible in a non-consequentialist desert-based sense—
would be to hold them responsible for the results of the morally arbitrary, 
for what is ultimately beyond their control, which is fundamentally unfair 
and unjust.
It’s important to recognize that the terms “free will” and “moral 
responsibility” are sometimes used in different ways.  But I have argued 
elsewhere that the sort of free will at stake in the free will debate, the 
sort that is of central philosophical and practical importance, refers to the 
control in action required for a core sense of moral responsibility (Caruso 
and Morris, manuscript).  This sense of moral responsibility is set apart 
by the notion of basic desert (Feinberg, 1970; Pereboom, 2001, 2014; 
G. Strawson, 1994; Fischer, 2007; Clarke, 2005; Scanlon, 2013; Caruso 
and Morris, manuscript).  Basic desert moral responsibility is essentially 
backwards-looking and non-consequentialist.  As Derk Pereboom defi nes 
it:
For an agent to be morally responsible for an action in this 
sense is for it to be hers in such a way that she would deserve 
to be blamed if she understood that it was morally wrong, and 
she would deserve to be praised if she understood that it was 
morally exemplary.  The desert at issue here is basic in the 
sense that the agent would deserve to be blamed or praised just 
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because she has performed the action, given an understanding 
of its moral status, and not, for example, merely by virtue of 
consequentialist or contractualist consideration.  (2014, p. 2)
Understood this way, free will is a kind of power or ability an agent 
must possess in order to justify certain kinds of desert-based judgments, 
attitudes, or treatments in response to decisions or actions that the agent 
performed or failed to perform.  These desert-based judgments, attitudes, 
and treatments would be justifi ed on purely backwards-looking grounds 
and would not appeal to consequentialist or contractualist considerations. 
It is this kind of free will and moral responsibility that is being denied by 
free will skepticism and it’s the kind required for retributivism.
Retributive punishment is incompatible with free will skepticism 
because it maintains that punishment of a wrongdoer is justifi ed for the 
reason that he deserves something bad to happen to him just because 
he has knowingly done wrong—this could include pain, deprivation, 
or death (Pereboom, 2014, p. 157).  For the retributivist, it is the basic 
desert attached to the criminal’s immoral action alone that provides the 
justifi cation for punishment.  This means that the retributivist position is 
not reducible to consequentialist considerations nor does it appeal to a good 
such as the safety of society or the moral improvement of the criminal in 
justifying punishment.  As Douglas Husak puts it, “Punishment is justifi ed 
only when and to the extent it is deserved” (2000, p. 82).  And Mitchell 
Berman writes, “A person who unjustifi ably and inexcusably causes or 
risks harm to others or to signifi cant social interests deserves to suffer for 
that choice, and he deserves to suffer in proportion to the extent to which 
his regard or concern for others falls short of what is properly demanded 
of him” (2008, p. 269).2
Free will skepticism undermines this justifi cation for punishment 
because it does away with the idea of basic desert.  If agents do not 
deserve blame just because they have knowingly done wrong, neither do 
they deserve punishment just because they have knowingly done wrong 
(Pereboom, 2014, p. 157).  The challenge facing free will skepticism is 
to explain how we can adequately deal with criminal behavior without 
the justifi cation provided by retributivism and basic desert.  As Neil Levy 
explains:
Traditionally, incarceration is seen as justifi ed, in part, by the 
desert of offenders: because they are guilty—morally, and not 
merely legally, guilty—we can impose signifi cant sanctions 
on them; the more weighty the sanctions, the more such a 
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justifi cation is required.... But if moral responsibility skeptics 
are right, agents are never deserving of the imposition of such 
sanctions.  Thus moral responsibility skepticism has practical 
implications: it apparently entails that major elements of the 
criminal justice system are unjustifi ed. (2012, p. 481)
In response to this challenge, free will skeptics typically point out that the 
imposition of sanctions serves purposes other than the punishment of the 
guilty: it is also justifi ed by its role in incapacitating, rehabilitating, and 
deterring offenders (see, e.g., Pereboom, 2001, 2014; Levy, 2012; Kelly, 
2009, 2012; Corrado, 2001, 2013).  Free will and moral responsibility 
skeptics typically maintain that implementing their view would not require 
closing the prisons (although major reform would likely be required), 
because these and other justifi cations would remain valid.
In the following, I will explain and defend my preferred non-
retributive approach to dealing with criminal behavior.  Since it takes as its 
starting point Pereboom’s quarantine analogy, I will begin by explaining 
Pereboom’s justifi cation for incapacitation and why it is preferable to at 
least two leading alternatives.
II. Pereboom’s Quarantine Analogy
Some critics worry that without retributive punishment the free will skeptic 
is left unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior.  But Pereboom notes 
that there are several alternative ways of justifying criminal punishment 
(and dealing with criminal behavior more generally) that do not appeal to 
the notion of basic desert and are thus not threatened by free will skepticism. 
These include moral education theories, deterrence theories, punishment 
justifi ed by the right to harm in self-defense, and incapacitation theories. 
While Pereboom maintains the fi rst two approaches face independent 
moral objections—objections that, though perhaps not devastating, make 
them less desirable than their alternative—he argues that an incapacitation 
account built on the right to harm in self-defense provides the best option 
for justifying a policy for treatment of criminals consistent with free will 
skepticism.  Before turning to Pereboom’s positive account, let me briefl y 
say something about the fi rst two alternative approaches.
Moral education theories draw an analogy with justifi cation of the 
punishment of children.  As Pereboom points out, “Children are typically 
not punished to exact retribution, but rather to educate them morally” 
(2014, p. 161).  Since moral education is a generally acceptable goal, a 
justifi cation for criminal punishment based on this analogy is one the free 
will skeptic can potentially accept.  Despite its consistency with free will 
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skepticism, Pereboom notes that a serious concern for this type of theory 
is that it is far from evident that punishing adult criminals is similarly 
likely to result in moral improvement (2014, p. 161).  Children and adult 
criminals differ in signifi cant respects.  For example, “[a]dult criminals, 
unlike children, typically understand the moral code accepted in their 
society” (2014, p. 161).  Furthermore, “[c]hildren are generally more 
psychologically malleable than adult criminals are” (2014, p. 162).  For 
these and other reasons, Pereboom sees this approach as less desirable 
than an alternative incapacitation account.
Deterrence theories, especially utilitarian deterrence theories, have 
probably been the most discussed alternative to retributivism.  According 
to deterrence theories, the prevention of criminal wrongdoing serves as the 
good on the basis of which punishment is justifi ed.  The classic deterrence 
theory is Jeremy Bentham’s.  As Pereboom describes it:
In his conception, the state’s policy on criminal behavior should 
aim at maximizing utility, and punishment is legitimately 
administered if and only if it does so.  The pain or unhappiness 
produced by punishment results from the restriction on freedom 
that ensues from the threat of punishment, the anticipation of 
punishment by the person who has been sentenced, the pain 
of actual punishment, and the sympathetic pain felt by others 
such as the friends and family of the criminal (Bentham 1823).  
The most signifi cant pleasure or happiness that results from 
punishment derives from the security of those who benefi t from 
its capacity to deter. (2014, p. 163-64)
While deterrence theories are completely compatible with free will 
skepticism, Pereboom notes three general moral objections against them. 
The fi rst is that they will justify punishments that are intuitively too severe: 
“For it would seem that in certain cases harsh punishment would be more 
effective deterrents than milder forms, while the harsh punishments are 
intuitively too severe to be fair” (2014, p. 164).  The second concern is 
that such accounts would seem to justify punishing the innocent: “If after 
a series of horrible crimes the actual perpetrator is not caught, potential 
criminals might come to believe that they can get away with serious 
wrongdoing. Under such circumstances it might maximize utility to 
frame and punish an innocent person” (2014, p. 164).  Lastly, there is 
the “use” objection, which is a problem for utilitarianism more generally. 
Utilitarianism “sometimes requires people to be harmed severely, without 
their consent, in order to benefi t others, and this is often intuitively wrong” 
(2014, p. 165).  While some skeptics believe these objections can be met 
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(e.g., Levy, 2012), Pereboom recommends that free will skeptics seek a 
different alternative to retributivism.
Luckily for skeptics there is a legitimate theory for prevention of 
especially dangerous crime that is neither undercut by free will skepticism 
nor by other moral considerations.  This theory is based on an analogy with 
quarantine and draws on a comparison between treatment of dangerous 
criminals and treatment of carriers of dangerous diseases.  As Pereboom 
describes it:
The free will skeptic claims that criminals are not morally 
responsible for their actions in the basic desert sense.  Plainly, 
many carriers of dangerous diseases are not responsible in 
this or in any sense for having contracted these diseases.  We 
generally agree that it is sometimes permissible to quarantine 
them nevertheless.  But then, even if a dangerous criminal 
is not morally responsible for his crimes in the basic desert 
sense (perhaps because no one is ever in this way morally 
responsible) it could be as legitimate to preventatively detain 
him as to quarantine the non-responsible carrier of a serious 
communicable disease. (2014, p. 156)
It is important to note that this analogy places several constraints on the 
treatment of criminals.  
[A]s less dangerous diseases justify only preventative measures 
less restrictive than quarantine, so less dangerous criminal 
tendencies justify only more moderate restraints.  In addition, 
the incapacitation account that results from this analogy 
demands a degree of concern for the rehabilitation and well-
being of the criminal that would alter much of current practice.  
Just as fairness recommends that we seek to cure the diseased 
we quarantine, so fairness would counsel that we attempt to 
rehabilitate the criminals we detain (cf. D’Angelo 1968: 56-9).  
If a criminal cannot be rehabilitated, and our safety requires his 
indefi nite confi nement, this account provides no justifi cation 
for making his life more miserable than would be required to 
guard against the danger he poses.  Finally, there are measures 
for preventing crime more generally, such as providing for 
adequate education and mental health care, which the free will 
skeptic can readily endorse. (2014, p. 156)
This is Pereboom’s incapacitation account and it provides a more 
resilient proposal for justifying treatment of criminals than either the 
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moral education or deterrence theories of criminal punishment.
One advantage this approach has over the utilitarian deterrence 
theory is that it has more restrictions placed on it with regard to using 
people merely as a means.  Concerns over the “use” objection, for 
example, count more heavily against punishment policy justifi ed simply 
on consequentialist grounds than they do against incapacitation based on 
the quarantine analogy.  And this is because, “on the quarantine analogy, 
as it is illegitimate to treat carriers of a disease more harmfully than is 
necessary to neutralize the danger they pose, treating those with violent 
criminal tendencies more harshly than is required to protect society will 
be illegitimate as well” (Pereboom, 2014, p. 169).  Furthermore, “the less 
dangerous the disease, the less invasive the justifi ed prevention methods 
would be, and similarly, the less dangerous the criminal, the less invasive 
the justifi ed forms of incapacitation would be” (2014, p. 170).  In fact, for 
certain minor crimes “perhaps only some degree of monitoring could be 
defended” (2014, p. 170).
Summarizing Pereboom’s proposal, then, the core idea is that the 
right to harm in self-defense and defense of others justifi es incapacitating 
the criminally dangerous with the minimum harm required for adequate 
protection.  The resulting account would not justify the sort of criminal 
punishment whose legitimacy is most dubious, such as death or 
confi nement in the most common kinds of prisons in our society (2014, 
p. 174).  Pereboom’s account also demands a certain level of care and 
attention to the wellbeing of criminals, which would change much of 
current policy.  Furthermore, free will skeptics would continue to endorse 
measures for reducing crime that aim at altering social conditions, “such as 
improving education, increasing opportunities for fulfi lling employment, 
and enhancing care for the mentally ill” (2014, p. 174).  This combined 
approach to dealing with criminal behavior, it is argued, is suffi cient for 
dealing with dangerous criminals, leads to a more humane and effective 
social policy, and is actually preferable to the harsh and often excessive 
forms of punishment that typically come with retributivism.
In the following section I will try to defend and expand on Pereboom’s 
quarantine analogy by considering it within the broader justifi catory 
framework of public health ethics.  The resulting account, the public 
health-quarantine model, will not only provide a justifi cation for the 
incapacitation of dangerous criminals but it will also provide a broader 
and more comprehensive approach to criminal behavior generally.  Its 
advantages include the prioritization of prevention, a focus on social 
justice, and a more detailed set of principles for resolving the confl ict 
between individual liberty and public safety.
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III. The Public Health Approach to Quarantine
and Criminal Behavior
My public health-quarantine model takes as its starting point Pereboom’s 
analogy but places it within a broader justifi catory framework drawn 
from public health ethics.  It makes use of the public health framework 
but also places some constraints on it and draws some insights from the 
traditional medical ethical approach.  The traditional medical ethics 
approach emphasizes four key dimensions—autonomy, benefi cence, 
nonmalefi cence, and justice (see Beauchamp and Childdress, 1989)—and 
focuses primarily on the individual (e.g., the patient-doctor relationship). 
The broader public health framework I have in mind, on the other hand, 
focuses on groups and larger populations.  For example, Ruth Faden and 
Sirine Shebaya (2015) have detailed a pubic health ethic that weighs such 
factors as overall benefi t to society, fairness in the distribution of burden, 
and the Harm Principle.  While it is not always easy to reconcile these 
two approaches since confl icts and dilemmas arise (see Phua, 2013), a 
successful justifi cation of quarantine, not to mention many other medical 
ethical issues, requires that a resolution be sought.  Below I will provide 
a public health justifi cation for quarantine, one that incorporates (as best 
as possible) the individualistic concerns of the traditional medical ethics 
approach but provides a method for confl ict-resolution when it cannot.
Let me begin with a brief summary of Faden and Shebaya’s framework 
for a broad public health ethic.  At its core, public health is concerned with 
promoting and protecting the health of populations, broadly understood. 
“Public health ethics deals primarily with the moral foundations and 
justifi cations for public health, the various ethical challenges raised by 
limited resources for promoting health, and real or perceived tensions 
between collective benefi ts and individual liberty” (2015).  There are two 
different ways of viewing the moral foundation of public health ethics:
One view of public health ethics regards the moral foundation 
of public health as an injunction to maximize welfare, and 
therefore health as a component of welfare (Powers and Faden 
2006).  This view frames the core moral challenge of public 
health as balancing individual liberties with the advancement 
of good health outcomes.  Consider for example, how liberties 
are treated in government policies that fl uoridate municipal 
drinking water or compel people with active, infectious 
tuberculosis to be treated…An alternative view of public health 
ethics characterizes the moral foundation of public health as 
social justice.  While balancing individuals’ liberties with 
promoting social goods is one area of concern, it is embedded 
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within a broader commitment to secure a suffi cient level of 
health for all and to narrow unjust inequalities (Powers and 
Faden 2006)….  Understood this way, public health ethics has 
deep moral connections to broad questions of social justice, 
poverty, and systematic disadvantage. (2015)
Obvious analogies exist here with non-retributive approaches to criminal 
justice.  From the skeptical perspective, we have to reconcile the fact that 
dangerous criminals do not justly deserve to be blamed or retributively 
punished for their actions with a more general concern for the wellbeing 
and safety of society.  We need, therefore, to confront the moral challenge 
of balancing individual liberties with the advancement of the public good. 
Yet the public health-quarantine model I defend also acknowledges that a 
comprehensive approach to criminal justice needs to be embedded within 
a broader commitment to social justice and addressing unjust inequalities 
(see Powers and Faden, 2006).  I side with those who believe social justice 
provides the moral foundation of public health ethics.  My public health-
quarantine model therefore has deep moral connections to broad questions 
of social justice, poverty, and systematic disadvantage.
Public health has four unique characteristics: (1) it is a public or 
collective good; (2) its promotion involves a particular focus on prevention; 
(3) its promotion often entails government action; and (4) it involves an 
intrinsic outcome-orientation (Faden and Shebaya, 2015, Sect.1).  These 
four characteristics can equally be applied to the concept of public safety. 
First, in public health the object of concern is populations not individuals: 
“Public health is, by its very nature, a public, communal good, where 
the benefi ts to one person cannot readily be individuated from those to 
another” (2015, Sect.1).  We can say the same thing for public safety—it 
too is a communal good.  The societal goods we seek in the criminal justice 
system (e.g., safety, security, justice, etc.) are aimed at the collective good 
and the policies we employ to achieve them are designed and implemented 
with the public good in mind.
The second characteristic of public health deals with prevention.  In 
particular, “promoting public health involves a high degree of commitment 
to the prevention of disease and injury” (Faden and Shebaya, 2015, 
Sect. 1).  In the United States, public health agencies like the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, the Food and Drug Administration, 
the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Consumer Protection 
Agency focus heavily on this preventive task.  The primary function of 
these agencies is to prevent disease, food borne illnesses, environmental 
destruction, injuries, and the like.  A non-retributive approach to criminal 
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justice modeled on public health ethics would similarly focus on 
prevention.  Preventing criminal behavior from occurring in the fi rst place 
is not only preferable in terms of public safety, it is more consistent with 
the commitments and beliefs of free will skeptics.  Skeptics acknowledge 
how patently unfair the lottery of life can be—we are not all born with the 
same set of mental capacities, psychological propensities, economic and 
educational opportunities, and the like. Instead of focusing on punishing 
criminals and building more supermax prisons, the public health model 
would advocate addressing the systemic causes of crime, such as social 
injustice, poverty, systematic disadvantage, mental health issues, and 
addiction.
Consider, for example, the alarming number of mentally ill individuals 
currently behind bars.  Studies have shown that about 20 percent of prison 
inmates have a serious mental illness, 30 to 60 percent have substance 
abuse problems, and when including broad-based mental illnesses, the 
percentages increase signifi cantly.  For example, 50 percent of males and 
75 percent of female inmates in state prisons, and 75 percent of females 
and 63 percent of male inmates in jails, will experience a mental health 
problem requiring mental health services in any given year.  It also appears 
that the individuals being incarcerated have more severe types of mental 
illness than in the past, including psychotic disorders and major mood 
disorders. According to the American Psychiatric Association, on any 
given day, between 2.3 and 3.9 percent of inmates in state prisons are 
estimated to have schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders, between 
13.1 and 18.6 percent have major depression, and between 2.1 and 4.3 
percent suffer from bipolar disorder.  Furthermore, individuals with severe 
mental illness are three times more likely to be in jail or prison than in a 
mental health facility and 40 percent of individuals with a severe mental 
illness will have spent some time in their lives in either jail, prison, or 
community corrections (Aufderheide, 2014; see also Glaze and James, 
2006; Karber and James, 2005).
I think it’s safe to say, “our jails and prisons have become America’s 
major mental health facilities, a purpose for which they were never 
intended” (Aufderheide, 2014).  To effectively deal with this problem 
we need a paradigm shift that conceptualizes mental illness as a public 
health and public safety issue.  We need to develop effective care and 
management strategies that are humane, just, and non-retributive.  On the 
public health model, the rationale for this is that “individuals with mental 
illnesses are more likely to be arrested, convicted, and move through the 
relentlessly revolving door between incarceration and the community” 
(Aufderheide, 2014).  Prevention would therefore be the primary focus of 
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the public health approach to criminal justice, with the use and justifi cation 
of incapacitation being limited to those cases we cannot prevent, and only 
then as a last resort.  And in those cases where we do need to incapacitate 
individuals, the public health and prevention model dictates that treatment 
and rehabilitation should be our goal.  As Aufderheide writes:
Perhaps the optimal solution to curbing recidivism of the 
mentally ill would be to conceptualize mental illness as a 
chronic illness and extend public health services into the prison 
immediately upon individuals’ incarceration.  By managing 
mental illness as a chronic illness—where the severity of the 
symptoms wax and wane in response to genetic and congenital 
vulnerabilities, environmental infl uences, and individual 
behavior—public health and safety offi cials can collaborate in 
developing more effective and effi cient strategies for managing 
mentally ill inmates in America’s jails and prisons and after 
release in to their communities. (Aufderheide, 2014)
A similar approach would be taken for dealing with drug addiction and the 
kinds of crimes committed by drug addicts to procure drugs.  If we want 
to reduce the rate of recidivism for drug addicts, the best thing to do (not 
to mention the most humane) would be to prioritize prevention, treatment, 
and rehabilitation.  It should be noted, however, that my claim here is 
limited to addressing crimes committed by addicts in order to procure 
drugs, rather than drug possession or consumption.  With the latter, 
possession and consumption, much of the harm to society (especially with 
regard to non-addictive drugs such as marijuana) actually comes from 
prohibition.  With addiction, however, individuals often commit different 
crimes to feed their addiction.  It is with regard to preventing such crimes 
that prioritizing prevention, rehabilitation, and treatment would better 
serve public health and safety.
I should note that while Pereboom acknowledges that free will 
skeptics can “readily endorse” measures and policies for preventing crime, 
his quarantine analogy does not require it.  His quarantine analogy is 
narrowly focused on justifying the incapacitation of dangerous criminals. 
By contrast, my public health model makes prevention a primary function 
of the criminal justice system.  Public health ethics not only justifi es 
quarantining carriers of infectious diseases on the grounds that it is 
necessary to protect public health, it also requires that we take active steps 
to prevent such outbreaks from occurring.  Quarantine, in a sense, is only 
needed when the public health system fails in its primary function. Since 
no system is perfect, quarantine will likely be needed for the foreseeable 
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future, but it should not be the primary means of dealing with public health. 
We should feel the same way about incapacitation.  The public health-
quarantine model justifi es the incapacitation of dangerous criminals but 
the primary focus should always be on preventing crime from occurring in 
the fi rst place by addressing the systemic causes of crime.  Prevention is 
always preferable to incapacitation.
The third defi ning feature of public health ethics highlights the fact 
that achieving good public health results frequently requires government 
action: “many public health measures are coercive or are otherwise backed 
by the force of law” (Faden and Shebaya, 2015, Sect. 1).  The same holds 
true for criminal justice.  Criminal justice, like public health, is focused on 
regulation and public policy, and relies less often on individual actions and 
services.  Any comprehensive approach to criminal justice therefore needs 
to address potential confl icts concerning justice, security, and the scope 
of legal restrictions and regulations.  While this problem is not unique 
to the public health-quarantine model (it’s a problem for all theories of 
punishment), there is good reason to think that the quarantine model is 
better suited than retributivism for dealing with it.  As Pereboom has argued, 
the quarantine model places several important constraints on the treatment 
of criminals.  First, as less dangerous diseases justify only preventative 
measures less restrictive than quarantine, so less dangerous tendencies 
justify only more moderate restraints.  Secondly, the incapacitation account 
that results from the quarantine model demands a degree of concern for 
the rehabilitation and wellbeing of the criminal that would alter much 
of current practice.  Lastly, if a criminal cannot be rehabilitated, and our 
safety requires his indefi nite confi nement, the quarantine model provides 
no justifi cation for making his life more miserable than would be required 
to guard against the danger he poses (2014, p. 156).  Retributivism does 
not include such constraints and in actual practice often leads to punitive 
systems of punishment and inhumane treatment of prisoners.
Finally, the last defi ning feature of public health ethics is that it has a 
consequentialist orientation.  As Faden and Shebaya write:
Promoting public health means seeking to avoid bad health 
outcomes and advance good ones.  As noted at the outset, in some 
discussions of public health ethics, this outcome-orientation 
is viewed as the moral justifi cation and foundation of public 
health and, as with all consequentialist schemes, is presented 
as needing to be constrained by attention to deontological 
concerns such as rights, and by attention to justice-related 
concerns such as the fair distribution of burdens (Childress et 
al. 2002; Kass 2001).  While public health ethics has to engage 
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with the traditional problems raised by its consequentialist 
commitments, for those who view social justice as the moral 
foundation of public health, considerations of justice provide 
the frame within which the moral implications of public health’s 
consequentialist orientation are addressed. (2015, Sect. 1)
The public health quarantine model I defend views social justice as its 
foundation and seeks to restrict the consequentialist orientation of public 
health ethics by considering the justifi cation of quarantine within a broader 
social justice framework.  Considerations of social justice and fairness 
are important foundational principles in my public health-quarantine 
model and need to be kept in mind at all times.  I will say more about the 
importance of social justice to public health and safety below.
Now that we have a better understanding of the scope of public 
health ethics, it’s time that I turn to the principles of traditional medical 
ethics: autonomy, benefi cence, nonmalefi cence, and justice.  Below I will 
provide a justifi cation of quarantine that relies on public health ethics but 
incorporates (as best as possible) the principles of autonomy, benefi cence, 
nonmalefi cence, and justice.  Where confl icts arise, as they do with the 
principle of autonomy, I will provide a method for confl ict-resolution 
consistent with public health ethics.  The resulting justifi catory framework 
will serve as the foundation for my public health-quarantine model of 
criminal behavior.
Autonomy
The individualist approach to “autonomy” places primary emphasis on 
the liberty, privacy, and informed consent of individual persons in the face 
of a health intervention carried out by other parties.  It acknowledges a 
person’s right to make choices, to hold views, and to take actions based on 
personal values and beliefs.  It’s the principle of autonomy that precludes 
running experiments on humans without their informed consent.  It’s also 
the principle of autonomy that grants patients the right to refuse or deny 
medical treatment—e.g., the right of cancer patients to refuse chemotherapy 
or the right of Jehovah’s Witnesses to refuse blood transfusions.  When 
it comes to quarantine, however, the principle of autonomy needs to be 
weighed against the broader public health framework that requires us to 
consider the wellbeing and safety of society.  The public health framework 
maintains that the control of infectious diseases necessitates public health 
interventions that often infringe on the autonomy of individuals.  While 
such infringement is unfortunate it is also necessary because such diseases 
can spread from the infected individual to other people, with the young, 
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the elderly, and the immune-compromised often at highest risk.  The broad 
public health framework therefore justifi es quarantine on the grounds that 
it is needed to prevent harm from occurring to others.3
While I accept this public health justifi cation of quarantine, I see the 
sacrifi ce of autonomy as regrettable (though necessary).  Given that free will 
skepticism rejects the notion that individuals justly deserve to be punished, 
I believe the justifi catory burden is always on those who want to limit 
one’s liberty and autonomy by means of incarceration or incapacitation. 
In the case of dangerous criminals who pose a continued threat to society, 
the public health-quarantine model can meet this justifi catory burden 
without appealing to notions of basic desert and retribution.  In those 
cases where the threat of harm to others is very low, however, I maintain 
that signifi cant weight should be given to the principle of autonomy.  This 
raises an interesting question: how should we go about deciding when 
autonomy should be preserved and when it should be overridden?  It is 
here that public health ethics can appeal to J.S. Mill’s Harm Principle.
As Faden and Shebaya note, “no classic philosophical work is cited 
more often in the public health ethics literature than John Stuart Mill’s 
On Liberty (Mill 1869)” (2015, Sect. 2.4).  Mill’s famous harm principle 
maintains that the only justifi cation for interfering with the liberty of an 
individual, against her will, is to prevent harm to others.  As Mill states 
the principle:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually 
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any 
of their number, is self-protection.  That the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of 
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others.  He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear 
because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make 
him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would 
be wise, or even right. (1869)
The principle includes two main components: one asserting that self-
protection or the prevention of harm to others is sometimes a suffi cient 
warrant for limiting liberty, and the other claiming that the individual’s 
own good is never a suffi cient warrant for the exercise of compulsion 
either by society as a whole or by its individual members.
In public health ethics, the principle is relied upon to justify various 
infectious disease control interventions including quarantine.  In fact, “the 
harm principle is often viewed as the most compelling justifi cation for 
public health policies that interfere with individual liberty” (Faden and 
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Shebaya, 2015, Sect. 2.4).  The harm principle is consistent with the public 
health-quarantine model since it provides one of the main justifi cations for 
quarantine.  Infectious diseases put at risk not only the carrier but also the 
health and wellbeing of others, hence self-protection and the prevention of 
harm to others justifi es quarantine.  The same is true for the incapacitation 
of dangerous criminals who pose a continued risk to society.  The harm 
principle, however, can also be used to carve out a protected space for 
autonomy.  If a cancer patient wishes to refuse life-saving treatment, 
say chemotherapy, the harm principle dictates that we must respect 
their wishes.  Even if the treatment could save the individual’s life, their 
autonomy should be respected since the decision to forgo treatment is self-
regarding and poses no signifi cant harm to others.  The same can be said 
for the Jehovah’s Witness who refuses a blood transfusion.  According 
to the harm principle, then, autonomy should be preserved when self-
protection and the prevention of harm to others is not at issue.
Of course, important questions still remain: How signifi cant must 
the threat of harm be with regard to both its likelihood and magnitude? 
How much liberty/autonomy are we justifi ed in limiting in the name of 
self-protection and the prevention of harm to others?  Etc.  While such 
questions are important, it’s hard to answer them in the abstract.  And 
instead of going through specifi c examples, I will simply say that the 
public health-quarantine model provides a useful set of constraints on how 
we can answer such questions.  When someone fails to heed a stop sign, 
for example, they put at risk the potential safety of others.  The right of 
self-protection and the harm principle justify liberty-limiting laws backed 
by the threat of sanctions, but the sanctions in this case would need to 
be signifi cantly low since my account prohibits treating individuals more 
harshly than is required to protect society.  Just as it is illegitimate to 
treat carriers of a disease more harmfully than is necessary to neutralize 
the danger they pose, treating criminals more harshly than is required to 
protect society will be illegitimate as well (Pereboom, 2014, p. 169).  I 
think a forwarding-looking conception of moral responsibility grounding 
in future protection and moral formation could justify a suitable fi ne here, 
but not more punitive measures.  Such small infractions are analogous to 
common colds.4  While they do put at risk the health of others, the harm 
they represent is not signifi cant enough to justify quarantine.
To successfully implement the public health-quarantine model in the 
criminal justice system, then, we would need to reevaluate the harms posed 
by various crimes so as to determine the appropriate reaction.  Justice 
and fairness demand that we undertake this reevaluation so that liberty is 
limited no more than is absolutely necessary.  The harm principle allows 
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for the limiting of liberty when self-protection and the prevention of harm 
to others is at issue, but this should always be coupled with the principle of 
least infringement, which holds that the least restrictive measures should be 
taken to protect public health and safety.  In the case of “victimless crimes” 
where no one is harmed save the person engaged in the act, assuming such 
cases exist, the harm principle would recommend decriminalization.  The 
private use of marijuana may be such a case.  But even if its not, one thing 
is clear: many of the low-level crimes we currently incarcerate people for 
(sometimes for many years) would be judged from the perspective of the 
public health model as excessively punitive and unjustifi ed.
It’s worth noting here that the public health-quarantine model provides 
a distinct advantage over rival non-retributive accounts.  Critics often 
argue that only retributivism can guarantee proportionality since it sets 
an upper bound for harshness of response (see, e.g., Zimmerman, 2011). 
The public health-quarantine model, however, ensures that harshness will 
be proportionate to the danger posed by an individual. Any sanctions that 
exceed this upper bound will be considered unjustifi ed.
Benefi cence and Nonmalefi cence
The principles of benefi cence and nonmalefi cence are closely related. 
The principle of benefi cence refers to an action done for the benefi t of 
others.  The word “benefi cence” comes from the Latin for “doing good.” 
Benefi cent actions can be taken to help prevent or remove harms or to 
simply improve the situation of others.  The principle of nonmalefi cence, 
on the other hand, means to “do no harm.”  This means that physicians 
must refrain from providing ineffective treatments or acting with 
malice toward patients.  Since many treatments involve some degree of 
harm (e.g., side effects from drugs, chemotherapy, etc.) the principle of 
nonmalefi cence is typically interpreted as implying that the harm should 
not be disproportionate to the reasonably expected benefi ts of treatment. 
The justifi cation for these principles is drawn from the goals and purpose 
of health care itself.  The goal of health care is to help people get and 
stay healthy.  It exists to do people good and not harm. Health care is 
an essentially benefi cent phenomenon.  Public health ethics is also a 
benefi cent phenomenon since it aims at promoting public health.
When it comes to the justifi cation of quarantine, the principles 
of benefi cence and nonmalefi cence are applied to society as a whole. 
Quarantine is consistent with the principles of benefi cence and 
nonmalefi cence since it seeks to benefi t society and prevent harm from 
occurring.  Of course, when benefi cence and nonmalefi cence are applied 
to society rather than individuals, confl icts can arise.  This is why the 
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restrictions outlined above are designed to protect individual autonomy 
to the fullest extent possible consistent with a concern for public health 
and safety.  Additionally, the principles of benefi cence and nonmalefi cence 
further add that quarantine is only justifi ed when (a) the benefi ts to society 
(protection from infectious disease) are greater than the burdens placed 
upon those in quarantine; (b) the burdens placed on those in quarantine 
cause the least harm possible; and (c) those placed in quarantine are 
provided with adequate care (including treatment).
Applying these principles to the criminal justice system would 
require major reform.  Consider, for instance, the use of extended 
solitary confi nement in many supermax prisons.  Prisoners are isolated in 
windowless, soundproof cubicles for 23 to 24 hours each day, sometimes 
for decades.  The cell itself is usually smaller than a typical horse stable, 
approximately 80 square feet, and furnished with a bed, a sink and toilet, 
but rarely much else.  Food is delivered through a slot in the door, and 
each day inmates are allowed just one hour of exercise, in a cage.  Under 
such conditions, prisoners experience severe suffering, often resulting in 
serious psychological problems.  Supreme court Justice Anthony Kennedy 
recently stated that, “solitary confi nement literally drives men mad”5 and 
the United Nations agrees.  In 2011 the U.N. issued a report claiming that 
long-term solitary isolation is a form of torture—a cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment prohibited by international law.
The practice of solitary confi nement is clearly inconsistent with 
the principles of benefi cence and nonmalefi cence and the public health 
approach more generally.  If we were to adopt the public health approach 
to criminal behavior, the practice would need to be ended immediately. 
While the public health-quarantine model justifi es the incapacitation 
of dangerous criminals, it does not justify treating them cruelly.  The 
principles of benefi cence and nonmalefi cence require us to do what we can 
to rehabilitate criminals and perhaps even provide them with continued 
support upon release.  Of course, strong retributivist intuitions often get in 
the way of such progress.  While most reasonable retributivists, and I know 
many, acknowledge that the United States imprisons far too many people 
in far too harsh conditions, retributivism nonetheless remains committed 
to the core belief that criminals deserve to be punished and suffer for the 
harms they have caused.  This retributive impulse in actual practice, rather 
than in pure theory, often leads to practices and policies that try to make 
life in prison as unpleasant as possible.  It was this retributive impulse, 
for instance, that was recently behind the effort in England and Wales to 
create a blanket ban on sending books to prisoners.  Luckily, the high court 
declared the book ban unlawful, reasoning that books are often essential to 




The last principle of traditional medical ethics deals with justice.  The 
principle of justice demands that we treat others equitably and distribute 
benefi ts and burdens fairly.  It’s the principle of justice that requires 
scarce medical resources be distributed fairly and consistently.  Organ 
transplantation is a good example since there is more demand for organs 
than there is supply.  In deciding who should receive a heart or live 
transplant fi rst, the principle of justice demands that we treat all parties 
fairly, consistently, and non-prejudicially.  Whatever procedural method 
we agree on, it must be applied consistently across all cases and not 
discriminate between potential recipients in an unjust manner.
When applied to quarantine, the principle of justice means that 
decisions for the application of quarantine be made using a fair process, 
include a publicly available rationale for those decisions, a mechanism 
for dispute resolution, and a regulatory body to enforce decisions (Baum, 
Gollust, and Jacobson, 2007).  In addition, offi cials need to exhibit 
transparency regarding the goals to be accomplished and whether the 
benefi ts and burdens of their decisions are expected to be distributed 
equally throughout the community.  Where inequality exists, there must 
be a rationale and justifi cation for that disparity (Baum, Gollust, and 
Jacobson, 2007).  The principle of justice is therefore extremely important 
to the proper justifi cation and application of quarantine.  Its importance to 
public health ethics, however, goes far beyond this.
In the version of public health ethics I defend, social justice is 
a foundational cornerstone.  And even for those who do not share this 
foundational commitment, there is wide agreement that social justice is 
important:
Whether social justice is viewed as a side constraint on 
the benefi cence-based foundation of public health, or as 
foundational in its own right, there is broad agreement that 
a commitment to improving the health of those who are 
systematically disadvantaged is as constitutive of public health 
as is the commitment to promote health generally (Powers & 
Faden 2006; Institute of Medicine (USA) 2003; Thomas, Sage, 
Dillenberg & Guillory 2002; Nuffi eld Council on Bioethics 
2007; Kass 2001; Venkatapuram 2011; Gostin 2012).  (Faden 
and Shebaya, 2015, Sect.3)
In public health ethics, a failure on the part of public health institutions to 
ensure the social conditions necessary to achieve a suffi cient level of health 
is considered a grave injustice.  For many in the public health sector, “the 
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extraordinary disparities in life expectancy, child survival and health that 
distinguish those living in rich and poor countries constitutes a profound 
injustice that is the duty of the global community to redress” (Faden and 
Shebaya, 2015, Sect. 3).  An important task of public health ethics, then, 
is to identify which inequalities in health are the most egregious and thus 
which should be given the highest priority in public health policy and 
practice.
The public health approach to criminal behavior likewise maintains 
that a core moral function of the criminal justice system is to identify 
and remedy social an economic inequalities responsible for crime.  Just 
as public health is negatively affected by poverty, racism, and systematic 
inequality, so too is public safety.  Faden and Shebaya eloquently describe 
how health can be affected in this way:
When inequalities in health exist between socially dominant and 
socially disadvantaged groups, they are all the more important 
because they occur in conjunction with other disparities in well-
being and compound them (Wolff & de-Shalit 2007; Powers 
& Faden 2006).  Reducing such inequalities are specifi c 
priorities in the public health goals of national and international 
institutions…Whether through processes of oppression, 
domination, or subordination, patterns of systemic disadvantage 
associated with group membership are invidious and 
profoundly unjust.  They affect every dimension of well-being, 
including health.  In many contexts, poverty co-travels with the 
systematic disadvantage associated with racism, sexism, and 
other forms of denigrated group membership.  However, even 
when it does not, the dramatic differential in material resources, 
social infl uence and social status that is the hallmark of severe 
poverty brings with it systematic patterns of disadvantage that 
can be as diffi cult to escape as those experienced by the most 
oppressed minority groups.  Even when these patterns are 
lessened, the life prospects of persons living in severe poverty 
or in dominated groups often continue to be far below that of 
others.  A critical moral function of public health is to vigilantly 
monitor the health of systematically disadvantaged groups and 
intervene to reduce the inequalities so identifi ed as aggressively 
as possible. (2015, Sect. 3)
The broad approach to criminal justice provided by the public health-
quarantine model therefore places issues of social justice at the forefront. 
It sees racism, sexism, poverty, and systematic disadvantage as serious 
threats to public safety and it prioritizes the reduction of such inequalities.
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By placing social justice at the foundation of my public health approach, 
the realms of criminal justice and distributive justice are brought closer 
together.  Distributive justice concerns our collective responsibility for the 
background social and institutional conditions of individual choice (see 
Kelly, 2012), and it’s hard to see how we can adequately deal with criminal 
justice without addressing issues of distributive justice.  Retributivists tend 
to disagree since they approach criminal justice as an issue of individual 
responsibility and desert, not as an issue of collective responsibility.  But 
as Erin Kelly argues, it is a mistake to hold that the criteria of individual 
accountability can be settled apart from considerations of distributive 
justice:
It is not clear… that we should think of criminal justice in 
retributive terms. I believe our understanding of criminal justice 
is ethically distorted when we understand criminal justice apart 
from the framework of premises and principles that comprise 
a conception of distributive justice and its associated notion of 
collective responsibility.  Criminal justice… can and should be 
thought of in relation to the requirements of distributive justice.  
Distributive justice…is a matter of collective responsibility to 
promote certain basic shared interests.  The joint nature of this 
responsibility and aim bears on the formulation of a defensible 
conception of criminal justice.  This means that criminal justice 
cannot be individualist in the way proponents of the retributive 
view suppose.  (2012, p. 66) 
Making social justice foundational, as my account does, therefore places 
on us a collective responsibility—which is forward-looking and perfectly 
consistent with free will skepticism—to redress unjust inequalities and to 
advance collective aims and priorities such as public health and safety.
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, I have argued that the public health-quarantine model not 
only justifi es the incapacitation of dangerous criminals, it also demands 
that we monitor and redress social and economic inequalities and that we 
prioritize prevention.  Placing Pereboom’s incapacitation account within 
the broader justifi catory framework of public health ethics, I argued that 
the right to self-protection and prevention of harm to others justifi es 
incapacitating the criminally dangerous with the minimum harm required 
for adequate protection.  I also argued that a more comprehensive approach 
to criminal justice, one which views public safety as akin to public health, 
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requires us to prioritize the prevention of crime and the redress of social 
and economic inequality.  While retributivists have long argued that free 
will skepticism is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior, I have 
proposed an account which is consistent with the denial of basic desert 
moral responsibility, morally justifi able, and suffi cient for good social 
policy.  It is also preferable, I contend, to other non-retributive alternatives, 
such as utilitarian deterrence theories and moral education theories.  The 
public health-quarantine model therefore offers free will skeptics a way 
forward and a suitable conception of justice without retribution.6
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